In this post, Conor continues his analysis of of νοῦς in De Anima III.4. Was Aristotle’s characterization of being-in-the-world any less radical than Heidegger’s? Did Aristotle fall prey to thinking of man as a ‘thing,’ as an intra-worldly substance with properties?
In this post, Conor continues his exploration of Heidegger, Aristotle, and the conditions of intelligible experience.
In this post, Conor pursues a Platonic-Aristotelian Auseinandersetzung or setting of accounts with Martin Heidegger.
In this post, Conor compares the wise man from Metaphysics A to the Plato’s account of the Sophist. According to both, the two are closer than we like to imagine.
In this post, Conor contextualizes what, in an earlier post, he called ‘noetic reduction’ in the Enneads. Beginning with Parmenides, he argues that the roots of reduction go all the way back to Parmenides’s founding insight that ‘the same is for thinking as for being.’
In this post, Conor reflects on Plotinus’s method of ascent to the intelligible world by means of a critical analysis of mind and its contents.
Conor reflects on and defends his ‘transcendental’ reading of the Enneads.
In this post, Conor examines Heidegger’s critique of ancient ontology and suggests a way for Platonists to overcome it.
In this post, Conor examines Plotinus’ notion of double activity and causality. In it, he argues that Plotinian causality is not just a temporal event between moving bodies, but an ordered act of self-giving that occurs between beings.
In this post, Conor shares a paper on the impossibility of kakology (a science of evil) in Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius