Moses Atticizing

“For what is Plato, but Moses atticizing?” —Numenius
τί γάρ ἐστι Πλάτων ἢ Μωσῆς ἀττικίζων;

Posts by Jonathan Greig

In this post, Jonathan reflects on stability, its lack in modern life, its function as a prerequisite to the virtues in Aristotle and the Desert Fathers, and openly pondering if it must be sought again as a modern virtue.

In part 2/2 of a review on Matthew Briel’s A Greek Thomist: Providence in Gennadios Scholarios, I discuss Scholarios’ views on providence as the result of his synthesis of Aquinas and the previous Greek theological tradition, and draw some parallels to Proclus and critical assessments.

In part 1/2 of a review on Matthew Briel’s A Greek Thomist: Providence in Gennadios Scholarios, I outline the first part of Briel’s book, on the theological/philosophical background of providence in the Byzantine Tradition and Scholarios’ other key influence, Thomas Aquinas. I raise some questions from the overarching late antique/Platonist philosophical tradition.

On a somewhat different topic, Jonathan looks into the recent American novelist, David Foster Wallace, and his thesis on the role of narratives, the imprisonment of the postmodern self, religious ritual, and attention. The first in a series of posts, I suggest this ties into a similar theme in Plato as well.

Jonathan contemplates the nature of philosophy as an ongoing, open-ended activity of thought, critiquing, and continual re-assessing, through the frame of Dominic O’Meara’s notion of “Plato’s Open Philosophy”.

In this post I talk about about the perception of pagan philosophy in relation to divine Christian revelation as the criteron of certain truth for late Byzantine Christians.

In mid-November, a new book by Jonathan is set to be published by Brill on the first principle and the One’s causality in the late Neoplatonists, Proclus and Damascius. Jonathan briefly discusses the book’s study.

How does the intellect (νοῦς) know God, yet how is God incomprehensible to the intellect? A close study on Maximus the Confessor’s Ambiguum 22, where Maximus adopts an Aristotelian and (pseudo-)Dionysian framework in describing how one does—and doesn’t—know God.

Antonio, Conor, and Jonathan discuss some questions about Christian Platonism: what it is, what are some problems now with the idea, and how to think about an initial definition.